John G. Taylor
Emeritus Professor of Mathematics, Department of Mathematics, King's College, Strand, London WC2R2LS, UK
Abstract
we consider here how nre results arising especially from brain imaging but also from other areas of brain science (single cell analysis, deficits) are modifying our understanding of the neural representations involved in consciousness. The problem is discussed in termsof the two basic questions: where are the crucial sites for the creation of consciousness in the brain, and what is the appropriate representation involved? A framework is first developed and criteria thereby deduced for a neural site to be regarded as essential for the creation of consciousness. Various sites in the brain are considered, but only few are found to satisfy all the criteria. Past models of consciousness are considered as guides to developing an answer to the 'what' question. The notion of the central representation is then created, regarded as composed of information intrinsic to awareness: this representation is suggested as being in the partietal lobes. The manner in which the central representation can contain the complexity of consciousness is then analysed in terms of the three-stage model of awareness, for which brain imaging support is also presented. This model is then related to the higher-order thought approach. The paper concludes with a summary.
Keywords
consciousness, brain imaging, neural networks, deficits, working memory, attention