H. Robinson
Computing Department, Faculty of Mathematics, The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK
Synopsis
I discuss the contributions to computing of two strands of sociology, the sociology of scientific knowledge and ethnomethodological ethnography, with a view to developing a philosophy of computing. Such contributions are not unproblematic, yet they serve also to illuminate the nature of computing as a social and technical enterprise that is rooted in practice. The likelihood of immediate prescriptive engineering contributions from such sociologies is viewed with a healthy scepticism. However, the utility of such contributions in establishing a reflective discipline, with reflective practitioners, is seen to be a great value.
Key Words Philosophy of computing. sociology of scientific knowledge, ethnomethodology, ethnography, reflective practice, formalisms.
Introduction The broad rubric of this special issue is to explore the ways m which findings from the social sciences have had, and will continue to have, an impact on the design of intelligent systems. The title of my paper indicates a concern for the development of a philosophy of computing. As a means of setting the substance of my paper in a context, I want to begin by exploring the relationship (and constructive tension) between this rubric and my title. Put brutally, I examine and analyse the kinds of contributions sociology makes to computing in order to better understand the nature of computing: what it means to make progress in computing and what it means to acquire knowledge that is distinctively 'computing' knowledge. Less prosaically, I argue that the contributions of sociology to computing are not unproblematic and that neither is the nature of computing. However, such intentions should not be seen as negative. Put polemically, I see the nature of computing as problematic only because I argue for a richer conception than that which is ordinarily taken to be the case. In a similar vein, I see the contributions of sociology as problematic because they, in one sense, argue for a more critical appraisal of what it is to do computing.